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APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Appellant Julie Tschaggeny ("Ms. Tschaggeny" pronounced "Choggany") 
hereby submits her Appellant's Reply Brief and makes the following arguments in 
reply to those raised by Appellee Milbank Insurance Company ("Milbank"): 
ARGUMENT 
Upon review of both the Appellant's Brief and the Appellee's Brief it appears 
that the application of a couple of controlling authorities is undisputed. The first 
authority is a case which upheld the use of the collateral source rule in Utah. The 
second authority is the plain language of statutory interest in the Utah Code Annotated 
("U.C.A.") 
It is undisputed that Mahana v. Onyx Acceptance Corp., 2004 UT 59, 96 P.3d 
893 (2004) stands for the proposition that if one party will receive a windfall due to 
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overlapping coverage for a personal injury, the insured victim, not the insurer should be 
the party awarded the windfall under the collateral source rule. Milbank expressly 
recognizes Mahana as defining or restating the collateral source rule and as acceptable 
precedent in Utah. See Appellee *s Brief at 22-23. Utah case law establishes firmly 
that the collateral source rule applies to tortfeasors, such as the woman who negligently 
collided with Ms. Tschaggeny and caused her serious injuries. See, e.g., Phillips v. 
Bennett, 439 P.2d 457, 458 (Utah 1968). 
However, the issue of whether the collateral source rule expressly applies 
to a an insurer, such as Milbank, who provides insurance for damages cause by an 
uninsured motoris ("UM insurer") is an issue of first impression in Utah. The majority 
of jurisdictions which have addressed whether the collateral source rule applies to UM 
insurers has been that the collateral source rule, such as Milbank in this case, have 
found that the collateral source rule applies to UM actions. See, e.g., Lomax v. 
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 964 F.2d 1343, 1347 n.3 (3rd Cir. 1992) (holding that the 
majority of jurisdictions apply the collateral source rule to UM actions 
One distinct issue in this case is whether medical bills contractually written-off 
by health insurance providers will be treated by the court as a collateral source. This is 
also an issue of first impression in Utah. However, case law from Utah and other 
jurisdictions provide guidance on the analysis of the collateral source rule. 
The majority of states apply the collateral source rule to contractual write-offs. 
See, e.g., Robinson v. Bates, 828 N.E.2d 657, 664-669 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (finding 
that a majority of jurisdictions include write-offs in the collateral source rule). 
2 
Finally, it is undisputed that the trial court failed to follow the proper statutory 
method of calculating prejudgment interest as found in Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-44. 
Milbank argued that the method proscribed therein is unfair, but admits that the statute 
is controlling law. See Appellee's Brief at 18-19. 
L THE EXCLUSION OF MS. TSCHAGGENY'S MEDICAL BILLS WAS A 
REVERSIBLE ERROR 
A. Injured Parties in Utah Are Entitled To Retain The Benefits Of 
Collateral Sources. 
The collateral source rule provides that <cwhen an insurance company pays a 
party a sum of money pursuant to a policy, the premium of which was not paid by nor 
contributed to by the defendant, the payments so received belong to the plaintiff and 
are not to be credited to the defendant." Phillips v. Bennett 439 P.2d 457,458 (Utah 
1968) (citing 22 AmJur.2d, Damages, § 206). In Mahana v. Onyx Acceptance Corp., 
2004 UT 59, Tt 37,96 P.3d 893 (2004), the Utah Supreme Court explained the purpose 
and the application of the collateral source rule is to ensure that a wrongdoer does not 
profit from the compensation or indemnity from a third party. It also stated that it is 
permissible for the plaintiff in these situations to receive a windfall if that is what it 
takes to avoid rewarding the wrongdoer. See Id. atf 37. This holding was built on 
several prior cases which laid the foundation the collateral source rule. See, e.g., Gibbs 
M. Smith, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 949 P.2d 337, 345 (Utah 1997) (quoting 
DuBois v. Nye, 584 P.2d 823, 825 (Utah 1978)"[A] wrongdoer is not entitled to have 
damages, for which he is liable, reduced by proof that the plaintiff has received or will 
receive compensation or indemnity for the loss from an independent collateral source"). 
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The court in Mahana specifically stated that any source of aid, whether in the form of 
cash payment or in gift, could not be credited to the defendant in an action. See 
Mahana. 2004 UT 59, f 39. 
Because Utah has adopted the collateral source rule, the court should determine 
whether the collateral source rule applies to a UM insurer in a similar manner to a 
tortfeasor and whether Ms. Tschaggeny's health insurer's payment of the medical bills 
through a contractual write off should be considered a collateral source. 
B. A Majority Of Jurisdictions Apply The Collateral Source Rule To 
Uninsured Motorist Policy Carriers. 
Under Utah law the collateral source rule should apply to a UM insurer in a 
similar way that the rule applies to a tortfeasor. Utah law establishes that an insurer 
who writes coverage for damages suffered at the hands of an underinsured motorist 
steps into the shoes of the underinsured tortfeasor. See, e.g., Estate of Berkemeir ex 
rel. Nielsen v. Hartford Ins. Co. of Midwest 2003 UT App 78, f 7, 67 P.3d 1012. The 
fact that Milbank's duties to Ms Tschaggeny were created contractually as Ms. 
Tschaggeny9s insurer should not change the nature of Milbank's obligations under 
Utah tort law. Because the insurer steps in the shoes of the uninsured motorist, 
Milbank should be viewed under the law as the tortfeasor in all respects. Were the 
uninsured motorist sued directly in this action, the collateral source rule would 
certainly permit Ms. Tschaggeny to recover her medical expenses from such tortfeasor 
even if the same expenses were also covered by a Health Insurer. 
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Under the facts of the present case, public policy favors application of the 
collateral source rule to Milbank as it would to the tortfeasor. Milbank has accepted 
premiums for the very purpose of protecting Ms. Tschaggeny. Legally, Milbank stands 
in the shoes of the torfeasor and should be viewed in all respects as the tortfeasor. 
Since Milbank is legally the tortfeasor, the public policy of favoring the victim over the 
wrongdoer applies here for the following reasons: Ms. Tschaggeny has the risk of 
future complications from her injuries; she did nothing wrong, so equity would favor 
her over the party standing in the shoes of the tortfeasor; and Ms. Tschaggeny paid both 
for the UM insurer's premiums and for the health insurance premiums. 
Ms. Tschaggeny takes upon her any risk that the injury caused by the uninsured 
motorist may be exacerbated in the future. She, not Milbank, will be responsible for 
any such potential damages. The risk of future loss lies with her. It would be equitable 
that any potential windfall should lie with her as well. 
Because Milbank has received premiums to stand in the shoes of the tortfeasor, 
it should be treated under the law as a torfeasor. Milbank contractually limited its 
responsibility to Tscaggeny to a certain policy limit. However, up to that limit the law 
places Milbank in the tortfeasors shoes. Milbank is the party which drew the contract 
between the parties. Milbank is on notice that in Utah it steps into the shoes of the 
tortfeasor in all respects. Yet, there is nothing in the contract between the parties that 
changes that result. Ms. Tschaggeny has had her life and health interrupted while the 
tortfeasor inflicted these damages. If one party must benefit over the other through a 
windfall because of double coverage, it should be Ms. Tschaggeny. 
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Ms. Tschaggeny is the party who incurred the expense of premiums to obtain 
health insurance. Any benefit from that investment should flow to Ms. Tschaggeny 
who paid for it. Milbank would not have a defense to paying for Ms. Tschaggeny's 
medical bills if Ms. Tschaggeny did not have health insurance. Milbank should not 
receive a benefit that would not be there in the absence of Ms. Tschaggeny's 
investment for health insurance coverage. 
As set out in Ms. Tschaggeny's Appellant's Briefs the majority of jurisdictions apply 
the collateral source rule to uninsured motorist policy carriers. See, e.g., Lomax, 964 
F.2d at 1347 n.3 (holding that the majority of jurisdictions apply the collateral source 
rule to UM actions). 
C A Majority Of Jurisdictions Consider Medical Bill Write-Offs To Be A 
Collateral Source 
As described more fully in Ms. Tschaggeny's Appellant's Brief, the majority of 
jurisdictions consider medical bill write-offs to be a collateral source. See, e.g., 
Robinson, 828 N.E.2d at 664-669 (finding that a majority of jurisdictions include write-
offs in the collateral source rule). 
In the present case, Ms. Tschaggeny's medical insurance company contractually 
agreed with the doctor to pay his bills if he would accept less for his fee than his 
normal charge. How the doctor and the health insurer structure their relationship 
should not effect the responsibilities of Milbank to Ms. Tschaggeny. The benefit of 
health insurance to Ms. Tschaggeny is that the health insurer's pays a majority of her 
medical bill. Whether payment is in cash to the doctor or not, the benefit to Ms. 
6 
Tschaggeny is the same. The structure of payment to the doctor does not make the 
treatment of the doctor less valuable. He receives benefits from the insurance company 
that are non cash. For example, the insurance company may provide a source of 
referall and the insurance company relieves die doctor of the risk of collection. On the 
other hand Ms. Tschaggeny has conferred a benefit on the health insurance company 
through payment of premiums. It would be over simplistic to say that the value of the 
doctor's services should be determined by the actual amount he received. The effect of 
health insurance should be seen as redistributing risk and expense, rather than as 
lowering the cost of medical care. 
In this case Ms. Tscaggeny paid for two sources for recovery. One source is the 
benefit of the health insurance contract that Ms. Tschaggeny was entitled to through her 
payment of health insurance premiums. The second source is the payment of the 
doctors' bills by the insurance company which stands in the shoes of the tortfeasor. 
The fact that the doctor did not actually receive payment for a portion of his bill should 
not be a benefit that offsets the tortfeasor's liability. The UM insurer paid nothing to 
the health insurer for such an offset. The benefit of the various insurances should flow 
to the party who paid for it. 
This Court's recent holdings on the collateral source rule in personal injury 
cases should be explicitly extended to the context of UM insurers as well. If the 
collateral source rule would give a benefit to victim vis-a-vis the tortfeasor, that same 
benefit should flow to Ms. Tschaggeny vis-a-vis her UM insurer. Further, this court 
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should explicitly determine that contractual write offs in Utah are a collateral source 
and should be analyzed similarly to any other benefit of insurance. 
IL THE STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR CASES INVOLVING THE 
COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE IS FOR CORRECTNESS, WITHOUT 
DEFERENCE TO THE DISTRICT COURT'S CONCLUSIONS 
The standard of review for collateral source rule issues was set out in Utah's 
most recent Supreme Court case on the issue: "Whether the district court was correct in 
its application of the collateral source rule is a question of law that [appellate courts] 
review for correctness, without deference to the district court's conclusions." 
Appellant's Brief 1 (citing Mahana, 2004 UT 59, f 35). In Appellee's Brief (Milbmk's 
"Brief) Milbank argues that an admissibility of evidence standard should be used, in 
accordance with a 1990 case from the Utah Court of Appeals. See Appellee's Brief at 1 
(citing Erickson v. Wasatch Manor, Inc., 802 P.2d 1323, 1325 (Utah App. 1990)). The 
present case is distinguishable from the 1990 case of Erickson. In that case, the trial 
court excluded the prior testimony of several key witnesses, but reversed itself upon 
Erickson's submission of a Motion for Reconsideration. See id- at 1324. Erickson was 
a case on the admissibility of witness testimony which had no relation to the collateral 
source rule. In this case, if the collateral source rule applies, the full medical bills 
should have been admissible. The collateral source issue should be determined under 
the standard of correctness. 
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III. THE EXCLUSION OF MS. TSCHAGGENY'S ACTUAL MEDICAL BILLS 
WAS A REVERSIBLE ERROR 
A. The Fact That Ms. Tschaggeny Did Not File A Memorandum In 
Opposition To Milbank's Motion In Limine Does Not Make The Ruling Proper 
1. The court considered Ms. Tschaggeny's position on this issue. Ms. 
Tschaggeny presented an oral opposition to Milbank9 s Motion in Limine with the 
court's permission. Milbank argues that since Ms. Tschaggeny filed no Memorandum 
in Opposition to Milbank's Motion in Limine, she cannot complain that the subsequent 
ruling was made in error. See Appellee's Brief at 4-6. Milbank then cited to Pratt v. 
Nelson, 2005 UT App 541, 127 P.3d 1256 in support. See Appellee's Brief at 5. In 
Pratt, the defendants moved the court to strike the opposing memorandum, which the 
court granted. See Pratt 2005 UT App 541 at f 6. Pratt is distinguishable because the 
court considered Ms. Tschaggeny's opposition. 
Motions in limine are often filed on the eve of trial as was Milbank's. The court 
often decides a motion in limine without formal briefing and on argument alone. In the 
present case, trial was continued so the motion in limine was not addressed when filed. 
However, the court still had discretion to decide the motion based upon an oral 
opposition. 
2. Defendant has waived any claim that the court should not have 
considered PlaintifFs oppisition the Motion in Limine. Defendant has not preserved 
for appeal the argument that the court should not have heard Plaintiffs opposition. 
Both Ms. Tschaggeny's oral objection to the Defendant's Motion in Limine and Ms. 
Tschaggeny's Motion for Reconsideration were considered prior to trial in this case. 
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B. Ms. Tschaggeny Did Not Agree With Milbank's Motion In Limine 
Milbank asserted in its Brief that Ms. Tschaggeny agreed with its Motion in 
Limine at the June 24 hearing. See Appellee's Brief at 6-8. However, Ms. Tschaggeny 
did not agree with Milbank9 s motion. Milbank quoted words from the final paragraph 
of counsel's argument; however, that paragraph should not be read out of the context of 
the entire argument. As Milbank noted in its Brief, Ms. Tschaggeny's counsel 
unequivocally opposed the Motion in Limine: 
THE COURT: Let me just make the inquiry as to whether at this 
juncture Mr. Christensen is opposed. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Your Honor, I apologize. I was not aware 
we were going to raise this motion as well, but we do oppose it. 
R. at 975, p. 1. When the trial court gave Ms. Tschaggeny the opportunity to explain 
her opposition, she did so as follows: 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: ... Our opposition is that if there was an 
agreement between Ms. Tschaggeny and her doctors that they would not 
charge her a certain amount then I think the defendant's position would 
be well taken. In other words, if they put on the books something 
different than they actually intended to enforce* 
But the opposition is that under Utah law what a health insurance 
company does in the context of a personal injury case does not bind the 
doctor or Ms. Tschaggeny to what that doctor would be entitled to 
recover in a personal injury context. 
And I think that the confusion that could arise in such a motion in 
Limine where Ms. Tschaggeny - there is an insurance overlay, but the 
fact that a doctor has a contract with a health insurance company to say I 
will - these charges under this limit, does not prevent that doctor from 
coming after Ms. Tschaggeny or against the tort feasor [sic] for that 
contractual writeoff [sicj because the doctor would charge a non-
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contracting patient who is not under the health insurance umbrella that 
full amount... 
So we would ask even though - 1 think the way this has been 
presented by the defense makes sense and probably does not need an 
opposition in the terms of there's binding write down. I think to avoid 
fixture complications with the health insurance overlayer we'd just ask the 
courts to restrict the motion to what it has been brought rather than as a 
broad writeoff [sic] of any health insurance amounts. And on that basis 
we will submit it. 
Id. at pp. 4-5. 
Ms. Tschaggeny acknowledges that her words from the final paragraph of her 
argument were unclear and could be read out of context to imply that she was agreeing 
with Milbank's Motion in Limine as it was written. However, taken in context with her 
entire argument, it is obvious that she did not intend to agree to the Motion in Limine. 
Rather, her argument was clear (other than the final paragraph) that she opposed the 
Motion except as it would apply to any non-contractual write-offs that she personally 
arranged with the physicians (such as the gift of a reduced bill), of which there were 
none in this case. The Milbank's argument suggested that if there was an agreement 
between the provider and the patient to accept less than charged, then the amount of the 
agreed charge was what should be admissible. Ms. Tschaggeny never intended to 
agree, nor did she ever agree to Milbank's Motion in Limine on contractual health 
insurance benefits. 
Rather, Ms. Tschaggeny opposed disallowing evidence of write offs due to a 
contract with an insurance company. Ms. Tschaggeny did not agree that amounts the 
health insurance company had reduced should not be admissable. 
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C. Ms, Tschaggeny's Motion For Reconsideration Was Timely 
Milbank stated in its brief that regardless of the merits of Ms. Tschaggeny's 
Motion for Reconsideration, it should not be considered because it was untimely. See 
Appellee's Brief at 8-12. The trial court has discretion in managing trial proceedings. 
However, evidentiary motions should be considered timely if there is no scheduling 
order to the contrary and the motion is brought prior to the introduction of the evidence. 
In this case the motion was brought before the jury was called and the court continued 
trial for one day to consider the motion. 
Further, the court had been briefed by the Defendant previously on this issue. The 
court's ruling on admissibility of evidence should have been based on the merits and 
that ruling should be reviewed for correctness. See Mahana, 2004 UT 59, f 35. The 
only rule that governs the timeliness of evidentiary motions in civil practice is Utah R. 
Evid. 103(1), which simply states that an objection to the admissibility of evidence 
must be made in a timely manner. Id. There was time for the court to consider this 
motion for admission of evidence on its merits. 
In its brief, Milbank referred this Court to the case of Parker v. General Motors 
Corp., 503 P.2d 148,149 (Utah 1972) for the argument that any issue once decided 
cannot be "resurrected/' In Parker, this Court rejected Parker's appeal in a very short 
opinion that provided few facts. It appears that Parker failed to timely appeal an issue 
with factual and legal merit and is distinguishable from the present case. 
However, Parker is not all-out ban on reconsideration of any issues that have 
been decided. For example, in a much more recent case, this Court stated, 
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Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) specifically provides: [A]ny 
order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates 
fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the 
parties ... is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment 
adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
Indeed, "[i]t is settled law that a trial court is free to reassess its 
decision at any point prior to entry of a final order or judgment.'5 Ron 
Shepherd Ins.. Inc. v. Shields. 882 P.2d 650, 654 (Utah 1994) 
Hall v. Utah State Dept. of Corrections, 2001 UT 34, ^ [12,24 P.3d 958. Thus, even if 
Parker was intended to preclude any reconsideration of decided issues, this Court 
overruled that doctrine in these later decisions. 
In at least one instance, a motion for reconsideration regarding prior exclusion 
of evidence filed on the last day of trial was upheld by the Utah Court of Appeals. See 
Erickson, 802 P.2d 1323. In that case, Erickson submitted a motion for reconsideration 
on the last day of trial in which he requested that the trial court reconsider its prior 
ruling that excluded some of his evidence. See id. at 1325. The trial court granted the 
motion and Wasatch Manor appealed. The Utah Court of Appeals upheld the trial 
court's actions, explaining that even at the time the evidence was excluded, it was 
admissible nonetheless and that Wasatch Manor was on fair notice of the evidence 
from pre-trial discovery. See id. at 1326-1327. Certainly if the collateral source rule 
applies to contractual write offs, Ms. Tschaggeny's actual medical bills, like the 
evidence in Erikson, were admissible even though the court excluded them. A motion 
to reconsider an improper exclusion of admissible evidence should have been granted. 
It was improper for the trial court to deny Ms. Tschaggeny's motion which was 
brought prior to trial for lack of timeliness. 
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D. There Was No Invited Error 
If Ms. Tschaggeny's evidence of actual medical charges was by nature 
admissible, it should have been admitted. Milbank asserted in its Brief that if the 
granting of the Motion in Limine and the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration 
were done in error, it was invited error based upon Ms. Tschaggeny's actions. See 
Appellee's Brief at 12-14. Milbank asserts as bases for this argument, "(1) her failure 
to file a memorandum in opposition; (2) her agreement with Milbank5 s motion in 
Limine; and (3) her untimely filing of a motion for reconsideration." Appellee's Brief 
at 13. However, none of these purported procedural roadblocks withstand scrutiny. 
Certainly, these arguments do not change the nature and content of the evidence. If 
under Utah law a jury could have considered evidence of write offs with a proper jury 
instruction, the court should have allowed the jury to do so. 
E. Milbank's Motion In Limine Was Not Substantively Correct, And The 
Motion For Reconsideration Should Have Been Granted. 
L The collateral source rule allows a court to consider all monetary 
damages in calculations of damages whether or not such are paid by a collateral 
source. As both parties have acknowledged, there is no specific Utah statutory 
authority or case law on the applicability of the collateral source rule as it applies to the 
facts at hand. However, courts of this state have held in favor of the collateral source 
rule. 
In its brief, Milbank asserts that this Court should not rule in Ms. Tschaggeny's 
favor by focusing entirely on the definition of "payments made by collateral sources." 
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Appellee's Brief, 15 (emphasis original). Milbank's focus on cash transactions is 
misplaced - Utah law is clear that the collateral source rule covers any source of aid, 
whether in the form of cash payment or in gift. See Mahana, 2004 UT 59, f 39. 
In footnote four to Milbank's brief, it asserts, "The term indemnity' is used to 
describe concepts of reimbursement and compensation'9 and supports this assertion 
by citing to Black's Law Dictionary. Appellee's Brief, 16 n. 4 (emphasis original). 
However, a careful reading of the definitions of the term "indemnity" in the latest 
version of Black's Law Dictionary reveals otherwise: 
indemnity ... n. 1. A duty to make good any loss, damage, or liability 
incurred by another. 2. The right of an injured party to claim 
reimbursement for its loss, damage, or liability from a person who has 
such a duty. 3. Reimbursement or compensation for loss, damage, or 
liability in tort. 
Black's Law Dictionary (8th Ed. 2004) (internal Keycite omitted, emphasis added). 
While the third definition does refer to reimbursement or compensation, the first two 
refer to "making good" and "claming reimbursement." 
In addition, Milbank cites to Bates v. Hogg, 921 R2d 249 (Kan. App. 2000) and 
Fischer v. Farmers Ins. Co. Inc., 106 P.3d 99 (Kan. App. 2005), to support its 
proposition that written-off bills are not covered by the collateral source rule. See 
Appellee's Brief at 17-18. However, Bates and Fischer were limited by the Kansas 
Supreme Court to apply only to Medicaid cases and Medicare cases where the 
Medicare provider is also the defendant and heath care provider. See Rose v. Via 
Christi Health System, Inc., ("Rose 2") 113 P.3d 241,248 (Kan. 2005) ("[W]e 
conclude that under the facts of this case, specifically where the Medicare provider ... 
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is the defendant and also the health care provider of the services which form the basis 
of the economic damages claim, the trial court did not err in allowing a setoff/'); Rose 
v. Via Christi Health System. Inc.. ("Rose 1") 78 P.3d 798, 804 (Kan. 2003) ("[W]e 
hold that the Bates decision is limited to cases involving Medicaid/'). The court in the 
Rose 2 could have expressly overruled itself on the Medicaid issue from Rose 1, but it 
did not. Therefore, it is reasonable to state that Kansas will only set aside written-off 
medical bills in those two limited circumstances, neither of which apply to this case. 
The idea of indemnity does not require a cash transaction. Rather, reduction in a 
bill by agreement or for payment both have the same financial benefit to Ms. 
Tschaggeny—which she acquired through payment of health insurance premiums. 
Both should be seen as a collateral source. 
2. The inclusion of the written-off bills should result in a windfall for Ms, 
Tschaggeny not the tortfeasor. Milbank argues that admission of the full medical 
bills before write offs would result in an impermissible windfall to Ms. Tschaggeny. 
This Court has previously ruled that such windfalls should benefit the victim not the 
tortfeasor: 
The collateral source rule provides that a wrongdoer is not entitled to 
have damages, for which he is liable, reduced by proof that the plaintiff 
has received or will receive compensation or indemnity for the loss from 
an independent collateral source. The rule applies even in those cases 
where it results in a windfall to the plaintiff based on the premise that the 
plaintiff victim, rather than the defendant tortfeasor, should be the 
beneficiary of any windfall." 
Mahana, 2004 UT 59, %31 (citations and internal quote marks omitted, emphasis 
added). 
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The insurance provider's actions of payment cannot be separated from 
negotiation for reduction since both are benefits of the health insurance contract paid 
for by Ms. Tschaggeny, even though Milbank argues to the contrary. See Appellee's 
Brief at 14-18. Ms. Tschaggeny, not the tortfeasor, should get the benefit of both. 
3. Ms. Tschaggeny incurred the written-off medical bills. Milbank 
repeatedly argues, "Ms. Tschaggeny did not actually incur the written-off portions of 
the medical bills. No one did." Appellee's Brief, 17; See also Appellee's Brief at 3,18. 
However, this argument fails. Milbank does not dispute that the medical bills were 
assessed to Ms. Tschaggeny and that she had an obligation to pay them. Rather, it 
argues that since a portion of those bills were later written-off, that they were never 
actually incurred. To "incur" something is "[t]o suffer or bring on oneself (a liability or 
expense)." Black's Law Dictionary (8th Ed. 2004). Clearly, the moment that bills were 
levied against Ms. Tschaggeny, she incurred the liability for those bills. The fact that 
portions were later written-off has no bearing whatsoever on the fact that they were 
indeed incurred by her. 
The trial court should have allowed evidence of the entire medical bills incurred 
by Ms. Tschaggeny. Further, the trial court should have excluded evidence of write 
offs by a health insurance company as requested by Ms. Tschaggeny in her motion in 
limine decided on the first scheduled day of trial. It was also error for the court to 
determine as a matter of law that the contractual health insurance write offs reduced 
Ms. Tschaggeny9s medical bills dollar for dollar. In effect the court not only allowed 
the jury to see the contractual write off, but determined that such write off was binding 
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on the jury so that it could not award to Ms. Tschaggeny the actual medical expenses 
she incurred. The effect of reducing the medical bills was to create an offset to the UM 
insurer's liability rather than to allow the benefit of insurance to flow to the insured. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING MS. 
TSCHAGGENY'S MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT, MOTION FOR 
ADDITUR, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
A. Mahana Is Applicable To This Case 
Milbank argues that Mahana does not apply to this case because it "does not 
address medical expense write-offs [and] ... is a Uniform Commercial Code 
conversion case" Appellee's Brief, 23 (citation omitted). Ironically, "Onyx/' the 
defendant in Mahana, made the same argument, and was overruled. Onyx argued that 
the collateral source rule did not apply to Mahana because it was primarily a rule that 
applied to insurance-related cases, not UCC conversion cases. However, this Court 
disagreed, stating, 
The rule is not limited, however, as Onyx suggests. Rather, the collateral 
source rule is applicable unless the collateral recovery comes from the 
defendant or a person acting on his behalf. If the benefit was a gift to the 
plaintiff... or established for him by law, he should not be deprived of the 
advantage that it confers. The law does not differentiate between the 
nature of the benefits, so long as they did not come from the defendant or 
a person acting for him. 
Mahana, 2004 UT 59, %39. Therefore, Milbank's argument that Mahana does not apply 
fails for the same reason Onyx's argument failed - the collateral source rule applies in 
any case involving collateral recovery, regardless of the nature of the wrongful conduct 
or the compensation therefrom. Therefore, Milbank's arguments are without merit and 
should be disregarded. 
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B, Mahana Did Add to, or Clarify, the Collateral Source Rule in Utah Law 
Milbank contended that contrary to Ms. Tschaggeny's assertion, "Mahana adds 
nothing new to Utah case law regarding the collateral source rule.55 Appellee's Brief, 
23. However, this argument is inaccurate. While it is true that Mahana largely restates 
the rule as it had been previously defined, this Court did add an element to the rule 
when it stated, "The rule applies even in those cases where it results in a windfall to the 
plaintiff based on the premise that the plaintiff victim, rather than the defendant 
tortfeasor, should be the beneficiary of any windfall/9 Mahana, 2004 UT 59, f37. This 
concept of allowing windfalls for the plaintiff clarified the Utah concept of the 
collateral source rule. The issue was not mentioned in any of the earlier Utah cases oil 
the issue (set forth more fully in Ms. Tschaggeny's Appellant's Brief). Therefore, Ms* 
Tschaggeny's assertion that Mahana represented a change and clarification of Utah law 
was accurate. Further Mahana also states that the concept of collateral source applies 
beyond the exchange of cash payments to at least include gifts. 
C. The Jury's Failure To Award Damages For Replacement Services Was 
An Error In Law Because It Indicates A Disregard Of Evidence 
The facts and ruling of the very recent case of Balderas v. Starks, are applicable 
to the case at hand. 2006 UT App 218, 2006 WL 1422568. In that case, Balderas 
asserted that he incurred medical expenses of $4,699.00, which was not contested by 
the defense; however, the jury only awarded $3,237.00. Balderas submitted a motion 
for a new trial based on rule 59(a)(5) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure under the 
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theory that the jury's award was inadequate, which was denied by the trial court. The 
Utah Court of Appeals upheld the decision, but stated, 
The jury was not required to adopt Balderas's damage theory wholesale. 
... [However, t]he fact-trier should not be permitted to arbitrarily ignore 
competent, credible[,] and uncontradicted evidence. Nevertheless, [the 
jury] is not bound to slavishly follow the evidence and the figures given 
by any particular witness. Within the limits of reason it is [the jury's] 
prerogative to place [its] own appraisal upon the evidence which 
impresses [it] as credible and to draw conclusions therefrom in 
accordance with [its] own best judgment. 
Id, 124 (citing Even Odds. Inc. v. Nielson, 22 Utah 2d 49,448 P.2d 709 (1968)) (most 
alterations original, emphasis added). Therefore, while a jury is not required to accept 
all uncontested evidence as absolutely accurate and true, it also may not ignore such 
evidence entirely. When a jury is found to have disregarded competent evidence, a trial 
court should grant a motion for new trial or additur. See Andreason v. Aetna Cas. & 
Sur. Co., 848 P.2d 171, 177 (Utah App. 1993) (holding that the trial court could have 
granted defendant's motion for a new trial or remittitur if it had found that the jury had 
disregarded competent evidence); Dupuis v. Nelson, 624 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1981) 
(holding that when awarded damages are so inadequate as to indicate a disregard of 
evidence by the jury, a court is empowered to entertain a motion for an additur); Batty 
v. Mitchell 575 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Utah 1978) (holding that a jury award that bears no 
reasonable relationship to the plaintiffs injury in light of the evidence could warrant a 
motion for a new trial). 
Milbank asserts that it contested the issue of the replacement services by going 
"into great detail in its cross-examination of Ms. Tschaggeny, and used the relevant 
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exhibits in doing so, regarding this claim and its validity, or lack thereof." Appellee's 
Brief, 25. However, what remains unsaid is the fact that Milbank was unable to elicit 
any information from Ms. Tschaggeny which would tend to disprove the value of or 
her entitlement to the replacement services, neither did Milbank present any of its own 
evidence as such. Therefore, the fact that Milbank did not present any evidence to 
challenge the value of the services or Ms. Tschaggeny9 s right to receive the same 
should have resulted in an award of at least some amount, (as it did in Balderas), even 
if the jury did not agree that the full amount was due. However, the fact that Ms. 
Tschaggeny9 s jury refused to award her even a nominal amount for the replacement 
services demonstrates that it arbitrarily ignored competent, credible, and uncontradicted 
evidence. 
D. The Jury's Failure To Award Ms. Tschaggeny Damages For The 
Replacement Services Is An Indication Of Passion Or Prejudice By The Jury 
While Ms. Tschaggeny did not specifically argue that the jury was influence by 
passion or prejudice in her Appellant's Brief, Milbank raised the issue in its Brief, to 
which Ms. Tschaggeny now chooses to respond pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(c). See 
Appellee's Brief at 24-25. 
Milbank is mistaken in its assertion that there is no evidence that the jury was 
influenced by passion or prejudice when it failed to award any damages for the 
replacement services to Ms. Tschaggeny. The jury's award of nothing was so 
disproportionate from that which Ms. Tschaggeny proved Milbank owed to her, that the 
award in itself is an indication of prejudice on the part of the jury. See Procon Corp. v. 
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UtahDeptofTransp., 876 P.2d 890, 896 (Utah App. 1994) (holding that since the trial 
court's award was not disproportionate, there was no indication of prejudice on the part 
of the trial court); See also Wheat v. Denver & R.G.W.R. Co., 250 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 
1952) ("[W]hen a verdict is so grossly disproportionate to any amount of damages 
which could have fairly been awarded as to make manifest that the verdict was so 
suffused with passion and prejudice that the defendant could not have had a fair trial on 
the issues, the trial court should unconditionally grant a new trial59) Therefore, since 
the award was grossly disproportionate to what could or should have been awarded, it 
is would be appropriate to conclude that the jury was influenced by passion or 
prejudice. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT APPLY UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-44 
PROPERLY IN ITS AWARD OF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST 
A. Ms. Tschaggeny Suggested The Method Used By The Trial Court, But 
Only As An Alternative If The Court Chose To Ignore Statutory Rules 
Milbank's assertion that the trial court used Ms. Tschaggeny's proposed method 
of calculation is only correct in part. See Appellee's Brief at 18-19. She originally 
asserted several times that the trial court should follow Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-44 and 
apply the interest from the date of the accident to the date of judgment, without any 
setoffs. R. at 784, 838-841, and 941-943. However, at the hearing on the matter, the 
trial court indicated to Ms. Tschaggeny that it was inclined to grant a setoff. Ms. 
Tschaggeny requested in her rebuttal that if the court was inclined to grant a setoff, the 
court should at least calculate the interest on the set off portion until the set off was 
effective. This argument was in the alternative: "The latter calculation comes into play 
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if the Court agrees with the defendant that Utah Code Annotated §78-27-44 does not 
apply." R. at 873. 
B. Ms. Tschaggeny Did Preserve This Issue For Appeal 
In its brief, Milbank claims that Ms. Tschaggeny did not preserve this issue for 
appeal and Ms. Tschaggeny's motions "reveals no mention of the method of 
prejudgment interest calculation suggested by Ms. Tschaggeny during oral argument 
and adopted by the trial court." Appellee's Brief, 19. However, Ms. Tschaggeny 
would refer the Court to her proposed Judgment on Jury Verdict; Reply to Defendant's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motions for Entry of Judgment on Jury 
Verdict and for Attorney's Fees; and Reply to Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition 
to Motion to Amend Judgment, Motion for Additur, or in the Alternative, Motion for 
New Trial, in which she very clearly makes the argument that the trial court should 
have calculated prejudgment interest according to a strict reading of § 78-24-44. R. at 
784, 838-841, and 941-943. Therefore, the issue was preserved for appeal. 
C. The Statute Does Not Provide For Offsets Or Substitution Of Dates 
This Court recently explained that when interpreting statutes, the Court's 
primary goal 
is to give effect to the legislative intent, as evidenced by the plain 
language, in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve. We 
presume that the legislature used each word advisedly and give effect to 
each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning. ... Only 
when we find that a statute is ambiguous do we look to other interpretive 
tools such as legislative history." 
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State v. Holm, 2006 UT 31, J^16, 2006 WL 1319595 (Utah 2006) (internal quote marks, 
internal changes, and citations omitted). The plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 78-
24-44 states that the damages assessed by a jury verdict are to accumulate interest from 
the date of the incident to the date of the verdict. 
No matter how strained a reading one may give to the statute, nowhere therein 
does it approve of bifurcating the award, excusing a part, and assessing interest from or 
to dates other than the ones indicated. Indeed if the trial court's method of assessing 
prejudgment interest were to be taken to the logical extreme, instead of the arbitrary 
manner employed, each bill levied against Ms. Tschaggeny would need to be assessed 
individually, with each billed amount bearing interest from a different date. Obviously, 
in cases of serious injuries such as this, there can easily be hundreds of separate 
medical bills, all of which would need to be tracked and calculated on their own - an 
arduous task which is avoided by the simple application of the statute. 
However, instead of following the statute or the more detailed calculation 
described above, the trial court lumped several dozen different bills together into a 
single amount and arbitrarily chose a date for purposes of calculating the prejudgment 
interest. The trial court's actions were in error. Furthermore, when assessing its 
erroneous calculation, the trial court admitted that it was intentionally ignoring the 
statute: "Further, since the Court is not willing to entirely overlook the application of 
§78-27-44,..." R. at 873 (emphasis added). 
Milbank argues that to award prejudgment interest on an amount that was 
actually paid years before would be unjust. See Appellee's Brief $120-21. Whether it 
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is correct in this argument is irrelevant because the statutory times and amount of 
interest is clear. Had the Utah Legislature intended to allow for variances, it could 
have done so easily by adding such language to the statute. However, the legislature 
did not. Since the language is clear, Utah courts must abide by the standard set forth in 
the statute. Therefore, Milbank5s argument that the award would be inappropriate is 
contrary to the statue. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in its application of the collateral source rule to this case 
and in its application of Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-44 when awarding Ms. Tschaggeny 
prejudgment interest, and she was prejudiced by these legal errors. Furthermore, there 
was a unmistakable disregard of the evidence by the jury when it failed to award Ms. 
Tschaggeny damages for the replacement services that she incurred after her accident, 
Ms. Tschaggeny respectfully requests that the decisions of the trial court on these 
issues be reversed and that this case be remanded to the trial court with an order that 
the trial court propose the additur as originally requested and that if Milbank refuses the 
additur, she is entitled to a new trial on the issues giving rise to this appeal. 
DATED this M day of June, 2006. 
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